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Resum
L’estudi de l’eficie`ncia en els protocols de Criptografia e´s una tasca clau per a la seva
futura implementacio´ tecnolo`gica ja que els recursos f´ısics dels quals es disposa exper-
imentalment no so´n il·limitats. En aquesta tesina s’estudia l’eficie`ncia en els protocols
de distribucio´ de claus qua`ntiques basats en l’entrellac¸ament qua`ntic. Usant estats
de variable discreta i destil·lant entrellac¸ament, sempre e´s possible destil·lar singlets
i aix´ı extreure correlacions cla`ssiques perfectes. En canvi, mitjanc¸ant estats de vari-
able cont´ınua com ho so´n els modes de la llum, la destil·lacio´ no e´s possible mitjanc¸ant
nome´s operacions Gaussianes. No obstant, mostrem que, utilitzant estats Gaussians
de llum bipartits i l’entrellac¸ament en les quadratures del camp electromagne`tic
d’aquests estats, s´ı e´s possible extreure sequ¨e`ncies de bits correlacionats, necessa`ries
per destil·lar claus aleato`ries segures de forma eficient. Obtenim que, usant estats
mescla Gaussians NPPT sime`trics i operacions Gaussianes es poden distribuir claus
qua`ntiques segures davant d’atacs individuals d’un espia. Davant d’atacs finits co-
herents no tots els estats permeten una extraccio´ segura. Mostrem quins estats s´ı
so´n segurs davant d’atacs finits coherents i l’eficie`ncia amb la qual es poden extreure
aquestes correlacions cla`ssiques davant d’atacs individuals. Finalment s’analitza la
relacio´ entre l’eficie`ncia, l’entrellac¸ament i la puresa per estats Gaussians sime`trics.
Concloem que un entrellac¸ament gran (me´s correlacions entre els modes) implica un
guany en eficie`ncia a l’hora d’extreure bits ben correlacionats. No hi ha una relacio´
un a un donat que estats amb el mateix entrellac¸ament pero` diferents pureses donen
lloc a diferent eficie`ncia. El que succeeix e´s que estats amb una puresa alta afavor-
eixen un augment en l’eficie`ncia donat que estem desentrellac¸ant l’espia, pero` aquests
estats so´n ineficients quan finalment realitzem Classical Advantatge Distillation on,
per extreure la clau aleato`ria segura un alt grau de correlacions e´s essencial.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Rolf Landauer, known for his remarkable contributions to the theory of electrical
conductivity, mesoscopic phenomena, and the physics of information, during the
1960s, as the director of IBM Research’s Solid State Science Division persuaded the
idea that information was rather than an abstract concept a physical one.
Nowadays the Quantum Information science (QI) has become one of the most
active fields of research. QI research spreads in two main areas, Quantum Com-
munication and Quantum Computation tasks. One of the most important topics
of Quantum Communication deals with the study of secure communications. Thus
Cryptography, based in protocols that exploit Quantum Mechanics properties, plays
a central role in Quantum Communication.
Cryptography refers to strategies which permit the secure communication be-
tween two distant parties (traditionally denoted by Alice and Bob) that wish to
communicate secretly. So its purpose is to design new communication algorithms
being sure that secrecy is preserved. In Classical Cryptography there is only one
cryptographic protocol, known as the ideal Vernam cypher method, which is ab-
solutely secure. The Vernam cypher consists of a random secret key (private key)
shared between Alice (the sender) and Bob (the receiver) used to encode and decode
messages. However, this method suffers from two drawbacks. First, if Alice wants to
communicate N bits to Bob, they will need to have a random secret key in advance
with at least N bits. Moreover, this key can only be used once to make the method
unbreakable. Second, the key must originally be exchanged by hand before the com-
munication to keep secrecy and it is essential that the key is totally random. To
solve the second issue, classical ways exist to distribute the key among them being
this distribution partially secure. This problem is known as Key Distribution.
In Classical Cryptography the problem of Key Distribution can be solved partially
by designing new algorithms which permit the distribution of the secret key in a
“practical secure” way. The price to pay is that absolute security is not achievable.
Nevertheless as security relies on the fact that to decrypt one needs to invert difficult
mathematical operations, the time to decrypt the key is long, and thus practical
security is achievable.
2 Introduction
The distribution problem is classically solved by using Public Key Cryptosystems.
They work as follows: Alice and Bob possess, in advance, a common secret key. This
secret key can be used many times to distribute among them, several private keys
that they are going to use to encrypt messages through e.g. the Vernam cypher
method. Any time Alice (the sender) wants to distribute a private key to encrypt
later messages, she only needs to make one key publicly available, referred as the
public key. From this public key any receiver can extract the private key, but only
Bob (the receiver in possesion of the secret key) can extract it in an efficient way.
Any receiver without the secret key needs to decrypt a problem which has non-
polynomial (NP) complexity. This way of distributing a secure key can be done even
when the key’s length is much smaller than the message and even if the key is used
several times.
Nowadays bank’s security, electronic commerce and the internet are mostly based
on one of these algorithms, the RSA Cryptography algorithm proposed in 1977 by
Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman from the MIT. Security in RSA algorithm relies on
the fact that to decrypt the algorithm one needs to solve the factorisation problem
which is an NP problem. Even now, there is no efficient algorithm known to solve
the factorisation problem. This means that even though computational resources
increase constantly, one simply needs to exploit the NP character of the algorithm to
make the solution harder to find. Moreover, the key can eventually be redistributed
and changed.
The “Quantum Computer“ arises here first as a menace for Classical Key Distri-
bution methods and then as a the solution for the security in Cryptography. Based
on the Quantum nature of the microscopic world, this new generation of computers,
still in a theoretical stage, are known to be able to solve hard mathematical problems
rapidly. In 1994 Peter Shor proposed a Quantum protocol to solve the factorisation
problem in an efficient way, known as the Shor’s algorithm. If such a computer can
be realised, current cryptographic protocols will not be anymore secure.
Can QuantumMechanics then offer a solution for a secure Cryptography method?
The answer is yes. Based on the intrinsic nature of the microscopic world, Quantum
Mechanics permits to perform Cryptography in an unconditional secure way. At
present, Quantum Cryptography is the only real implementation of QI. In this work,
we will present one way of performing efficient Quantum Cryptography using entan-
gled Gaussian states of light and standard optical devices (Gaussian operations).
1.1 Classical Cryptography
1.1.1 Vernam cypher
In Classical Cryptography there is a protocol called Vernam cypher which is abso-
lutely secure. This protocol is the best and most well known classical private key
(or ONE-TIME-PAD) cryptosystem. In order to achieve security in communications
between two parties (Alice and Bob) with the Vernam cypher protocol, one needs to
have a private key, in advance, possessed by Alice and Bob exclusively of at least the
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same length (# of bits) as the message to be encoded. This key has to be random
and in possession of Alice and Bob only, and so a Classical Key Distribution is a
pre-condition to achieve this absolute security. If this is the case, then Cryptography
is going to be absolutely secure and works as follows.
If Alice wants to encode a message m with the key k, she only needs to perform
the following operation between the message and the key, and send the encoded
message e to Bob:
Enck(m) = m⊕ k = e. (1.1)
Only Bob who has also the key can decode the message (invert the operation) because
the key Alice has used is random. Thus, he only needs to use the key again and
perform the following operation to the encoded message e to retrieve the original
message m:
Deck(e) = Deck[Enck(m)] = e⊕ k = d = m. (1.2)
Let us illustrate Vernam cypher with an specific example. Alice wants to communi-
cate to Bob, in a secure way, a message m (in a binary string) of e.g. 9 bits. They
share the key k of the same size as the message (9 bits). Alice encodes her message
by applying a XOR (exclusive OR) 1 operation between the message m and the key
k.
In the following table we summarise the XOR operation
⊕ 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 0
(1.3)
As a result Alice has the encoded message e, that will send to Bob in a public
way.
message m = 010011101
key k = 110100011
encoded message e = 1000111110
Then Bob wants to readout the message, and thus, performs the inverse opera-
tion (which is again a XOR) between the encoded message e and the key k.
As a result Bob has the decoded message d that coincides with the message Alice
wanted to communicate to him.
encoded message e = 1000111110
key k = 110100011
decoded message d = 010011101
1Also known as AND or ⊕mod (2).
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1.1.2 Public key distribution: The RSA algorithm
Thus far, Classical Cryptography has not solved the distribution of the private key
needed to perform Vernam cypher encryption. This distribution can be done in
a public and practical secure way with the RSA algorithm. Nowadays the RSA
algorithm is the most commonly used algorithm of public key. It is a Classical Key
Distribution algorithm that permits together with the Vernam cypher method to
perform secure communication as long as the factorisation problem is unsolved. Let
us illustrate how it works with the following example.
i) The sender, say Alice, chooses two ”big” different prime numbers, say p = 61
and q = 53 and computes its product n = p q = 3233 and also the following quantity
φ = (p − 1)(q − 1) = 3120.
ii) She chooses a positive integer l smaller and coprime with φ, in the example
l = 17.
iii) As a private key, Alice gives to Bob the number k such that k l = 1 mod (φ),
take e.g. k = 2753. At the same time Alice makes public l and n, what we call
public key.
iv) With the public key (l and n) anyone can encrypt a message m and send it
to Bob, but only Bob who is in possesion of the private key k is able to decrypt the
message. This method can thus be used to perform Classical Key Distribution. Any
time Alice wants to communicate with Bob, she sends a secure key encrypted with
l and n and only Bob will be able to retrieve it. Once Bob has the secure key, Alice
can send messages to Bob via the Vernam cypher using this secure key.
v) Encryption proceeds as follows. Alice wants to distribute a key encoded in a
message m = 123. She uses the public key and computes the encryption Encl,n(m) =
ml mod (n) = e = 855.
vi) Bob now wants to decrypt the message e to extract a secure key, so he
calculates Deck,n(e) = Deck,n[Encl,n(m)] = e
k mod (n) = d = m = 123. Bob is the
only one in possesion of the private key k and so the only one that can decrypt the
message e to find the secure key Alice is going to use with the Vernam cypher to
communicate securely with him.
The private key Alice and Bob share can be used more than once to distribute
secure keys, in such a way that, to perform Vernam cypher we no longer need to
share a long private key because we can distribute many of them in a secure way.
Security relies in the fact that, from the encrypted message e, and the public keys
l and n it is very difficult to find the private key k (and so m) or the original two
prime numbers q and p, even in the case we are reusing the key k. This is because
factorisation is a NP problem, whose efficient solution is not known yet. Security
thus, in the RSA algorithm, relies on the fact that with the current computation
resources, NP problems cannot be solved efficiently.
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1.2 The solution to the distribution of the key
What Quantum Cryptography offers is an absolutely secure distribution of a ran-
dom key which combined with the Vernam cypher guarantees completely secure
Cryptography. Thus, the Quantum Cryptography problem is in fact the problem
of distributing a secure random key, i.e. the Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
problem.
Quantum Cryptography relies on the possibility of establishing a secret random
key between two distant parties traditionally denoted by Alice and Bob. If the key is
securely distributed, the algorithms used to encode and decode any message can be
made public without compromising security. The key consists typically in a random
sequence of bits which both, Alice and Bob, share as a string of classically correlated
data. The superiority of Quantum Cryptography comes from the fact that the laws
of Quantum Mechanics permit to the legitimate users (Alice and Bob) to infer if an
eavesdropper has monitored the distribution of the key and has gained information
about it. If this is the case, Alice and Bob will both agree in withdrawing the key
and will start the distribution of a new one. In contrast, Classical Key Distribution,
no matter how difficult the distribution from a technological point of view is, can
always be intercepted by an eavesdropper without Alice and Bob realising it.
In Quantum Cryptography two seemingly independent main schemes exist for
QKD. The first, the ”Prepare and Measure“ scheme, originally proposed by C.H.
Bennett and G. Brassard in 1988 and known as BB84 [1], does not use entangled
states shared between Alice and Bob and the key is established by sending non-
entangled quantum states between the parties and communicating classically. Secu-
rity is guaranteed by the Quantum nature of the measurements. The second scheme
(”Entanglement based“), uses as a resource shared entanglement, like the one origi-
nally proposed by A. Ekert in 1991 known as Ekert91 [2], where indeed entanglement
is explicitly distributed and the security is guaranteed by Bell’s theorem. However,
the two schemes have been shown to be completely equivalent [3], and specifically
entanglement stands as a precondition for any secure key distribution [4].
1.2.1 ”Prepare and Measure“ scheme
BB84 permits a secure distribution of a secret key. The protocol does not avoid an
eavesdropper from intercepting the key, but it lets Alice and Bob know if the key has
been intercepted, and so that it can be discarded. Security relies in the Quantum
nature of the measurement. We sketch here the steps of the protocol.
i) Alice prepares a secret sequence of random bits and encodes them in the state
of a spin-1/2 system (or the polarisation of photons) by choosing randomly between
two bases (Z and X). Alice encodes |±〉 (|±〉x) according to 0/1 in base Z (0/1 in
base X). Then she sends Bob the states she has prepared. As an example:
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Alice random bits 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Alice random bases Z X X X Z X Z X X
Alice final states |+〉 |−〉x |−〉x |+〉x |+〉 |−〉x |−〉 |+〉x |+〉x
ii) Bob receives the states and measures in another random choice of bases. The
outcome of the measurements is going to be retained as the bits received.
Alice final states |+〉 |−〉x |−〉x |+〉x |+〉 |−〉x |−〉 |+〉x |+〉x
Bob random bases X Z X X X X X X X
Bob final states |+〉x |+〉 |−〉x |+〉x |+〉x |−〉x |−〉x |+〉x |+〉x
Bob received bits 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
iii) Bob communicates to Alice his choice of basis in a public way.
iv) Alice identifies the set of bits for which they have performed the measurement
in the same basis, i.e. outcomes 3, 4, 6, 8 and 9. Alice and Bob discard the set of
data in which they did not agree (the rest).
v) Bob sends part of his data (received bits) to Alice by a public channel. Alice
checks the correlation between the data.
vi) If the error rate is less than 25% Alice deduces that there is not an eavesdrop-
per present and she communicates it to Bob. Alice and Bob use the set of remaining
data as a private key to encrypt messages with Vernam cypher.
1.2.2 ”Entanglement based“ scheme
Other protocols exist, which demand as a fundamental resource, shared entanglement
between Alice and Bob. In the same way as in BB84, these protocols permit a secure
distribution of a secret key. This can be done as far as the protocol ensures if there
has been an interception of the key. Security relies in the Quantum correlations i.e.
entanglement like in Ekert91. We sketch here the steps of this well-known protocol
below.
i) The first step consists on distributing (along the z direction) singlet states of
a spin-1/2 system (or polarisations of photons) between Alice and Bob. Thus Alice
and Bob share many copies of a Bell state |Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|1〉 − |1〉|0〉).
ii) Alice and Bob are going to measure in the x − y plane in one of the three
directions given by unit vectors ~Ai = (cosφ
A
i , sin φ
A
i ) and
~Bj = (cosφ
B
j , sinφ
B
j )
respectively, where the azimuthal angles are fixed to φAi = (0, π/4, π/2)
i and to φBj =
(π/4, π/2, 3π/4)j . Each time they will choose the basis randomly and independently
for each pair of incoming particles.
iii) The quantity
E( ~Ai, ~Bj) = P++( ~Ai, ~Bj) + P−−( ~Ai, ~Bj)− P+−( ~Ai, ~Bj)− P−+( ~Ai, ~Bj) (1.4)
is the correlation coefficient of the measurements performed by Alice and Bob along
~Ai and by Bob along ~Bj. Here P±±( ~Ai, ~Bj) denotes the probability that result ±1
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has been obtained along ~Ai and ±1 along ~Bj. Straightforward calculations give rise
to
P++( ~Ai, ~Bj) = 12 sin2(φAi − φBj ),
P−−( ~Ai, ~Bj) = 12 sin2(φAi − φBj ),
P+−( ~Ai, ~Bj) = 12 cos2(φAi − φBj ),
P−+( ~Ai, ~Bj) = 12 cos2(φAi − φBj ),
thus according to the Quantum rules E( ~Ai, ~Bj) = − ~Ai ~Bj = cos(φAi − φBj ). We
see that whenever they choose the same orientation Quantum Mechanics predicts
total anticorrelation in the outcomes i.e. E( ~Ai, ~Bj) = −1.
iv) Here we define a quantity composed of those correlation coefficients for which
Alice and Bob have measured in different directions,
S = |E( ~A1, ~B1) + E( ~A3, ~B3)− E( ~A1, ~B3) + E( ~A3, ~B1)|. (1.5)
Again, Quantum Mechanics requires, S = 2√2 > 2.
v) After the transmission has taken place, Alice and Bob can announce in public
the orientations they have chosen for each measurements and divide them into two
separated groups. A first group for which they coincide and a second group for which
they do not. The second group of outcomes is made public and it is used to establish
the value of S.
The CHSH (Clauser, Horne, Shimony, and Hold) inequalities, a generalisation
of Bell inequalities, asserts that S ≤ 2. But Quantum Mechanics, and in particular
Bell states, violate CHSH inequalities. If this is the case, i.e. the value of S that
they find is exactly 2
√
2, they now that their states have not been disturbed and so
the first group of outcomes, that are random, are totally anticorrelated and can be
converted into a secret string of bits. Later on they can use this string as a private
key to encrypt messages with Vernam cypher.
1.3 Efficiency in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) pro-
tocols
As already mentioned, Quantum Key Distribution, refers to specific Quantum strate-
gies which permit the secure distribution of a secret key between two parties that wish
to communicate secretly. Quantum Cryptography has been proved unconditionally
secure in ideal scenarios and has been successfully implemented using quantum states
with finite (discrete) as well as infinite (continuous) degrees of freedom. We have
analysed the efficiency of QKD protocols that use as a resource entangled Gaussian
states and Gaussian operations only. In this framework, it has already been shown
that QKD is possible [5] but the issue of its efficiency was not considered. We have
propose a figure of merit (the efficiency E) to quantify the number of classical cor-
related bits that can be used to distill a key from a sample of N entangled states.
We have related the efficiency of the protocol to the entanglement and purity of the
states shared between the parties.
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Notice that if Alice and Bob share a collection of distillable entangled states,
they can always obtain a smaller number of maximally entangled states from which
they can establish a secure key [6]. The number of singlets (maximally entangled
states) that can be extracted from a quantum state using only Local Operations and
Classical Communication (LOCC) is referred to as the Entanglement of Distillation
ED. In order to establish a key, another important concept is the number of secret
bits KD, that can be extracted from a quantum state using LOCC. As a secret bit
can always be extracted from maximally entangled state, ED ≤ KD. Furthermore,
there are quantum states which cannot be distilled but in spite of being entangled,
i.e., have ED = 0. They are usually referred to as bound entangled states since its
entanglement is bound to the state. Nevertheless, for some of those states it has
been shown that KD 6= 0 and thus they can be used to establish a secret key [7].
A particular case of states that cannot be “distilled” by “normal” procedures are
continuous variables Gaussian states, e.g., coherent, squeezed and thermal states of
light. By “normal” procedures we mean operations that preserve the Gaussian char-
acter of the state (Gaussian operations). They correspond e.g. to beam splitters,
phase shifts, mirrors, squeezers, etc. Thus, in the Gaussian scenario all entangled
Gaussian states posses bound entanglement. Quantum Cryptography with Gaussian
states using Gaussian operations has been experimentally implemented using “Pre-
pare and Measure” schemes with either squeezed or coherent states [8, 9, 10]. Those
schemes do not demand entanglement between the parties.
Navascue´s et al. [5] have shown that it is also possible using only Gaussian
operations to extract a secret key a` la Ekert91 from entangled Gaussian states, in
spite the fact that these states are not distillable. In other words, it has been proven
that in the Gaussian scenario all entangled Gaussian states fulfil GKD > 0 (where
the letter G stands for Gaussian) while GED = 0.
The way to proceed in this scheme i.e., how can, Alice and Bob extract a list of
classically correlated bits from a set a of symmetric 1 × 1 entangled modes goes as
follows:
i) they agree on a value x0 > 0,
ii) Alice(Bob) measures the quadrature of each of her(his) modes XˆA(XˆB),
iii) they make public the modulus of their outcomes, but not the sign and accept
only outputs such that |xA| = |xB | = x0,
iv) they associate e.g., the classical value 0(1) to xi = +x0(−x0), i = A,B and
thus establish a list of classically correlated bits.
From there, they can apply Classical Advantage Distillation [11] to establish the
secret key. This protocol is secure against individual eavesdropper attacks. As the
protocol is based on output coincidences of the measurements of the quadratures
which, by definition, are operators with a continuous spectrum, this protocol has
zero efficiency.
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1.4 Outline
Efficiency is a key issue for any experimental implementation of Quantum Cryptog-
raphy since available resources are not unlimited. Since it is possible to extract a
secret key a` la Eckert91 from entangled Gaussian states in the Gaussian scenario
one important question is to address the efficiency.
In fact, the protocol suffers from an efficiency problem because the success proba-
bility of the protocol is vanishingly small. Here we study the consequences of relaxing
the conditions to a more realistic scenario. We assume that Alice and Bob can ex-
tract a list of sufficiently correlated classical bits obtained by accepting measurement
outputs that do not coincide but are bound within a range. We ask ourselves which
is the possibility that Alice and Bob can still distribute the key in a secure way under
individual and finite coherent attacks.
We find that there always exists a finite interval which the protocol can be im-
plemented successfully. The length of this interval depends on the entanglement and
on the purity of the shared states, and increases with increasing entanglement.
In Chapter 2 we review the formalism of Continuous Variable (CV) systems
focussing on Gaussian states. It will be shown that Gaussian states admit an easy
mathematical description based on phase space Wigner functions. We will introduce
also the basic ingredients to describe also systems with entanglement.
In Chapter 3 we will present first a simple academic protocol that permits to
extract a quantum key from an entangled continuous variable system. Differently
from discrete systems, Gaussian entangled states cannot be distilled with Gaussian
operations. However, as we will show, it is possible to extract perfectly correlated
classical bits to establish a secret key between the sender and receiver. We will then
demonstrate that this protocol, properly modified, can be made efficient and can be
implemented with present technology [12].
Finally, in Chapter 4, we conclude summarising our results and giving some
general conclusions and future directions of research.
10 Introduction
Chapter 2
Continuous Variable formalism
This Chapter is intended exclusively to describe Continuous Variable systems and to
provide the mathematical framework to analyse the problem of QKD in Continuous
Variable systems. We will focus then on Gaussian Continuous Variable states, which
describe among others, coherent, squeezed and thermal states of light. Presently
these states are the preferred resources in experiments of QI using Continuous Vari-
able systems. For further background information the interested reader is referred
to [13, 14, 15, 16].
2.1 Continuous Variable system
A system corresponds to a continuous variable system if it possesses two canonical
conjugated degrees of freedom i.e. there exist two observables that fulfil the Canon-
ical Commutation Relations (CCR). The CCR for two canonical observables qˆ and
pˆ read 1
[qˆ, pˆ] = iI. (2.1)
It is a direct consequence that they possess a continuous spectra and act in an infinite
dimensional Hilbert space.
As examples of CV systems we can think as the position-momentum of a mas-
sive particle, the quadratures of an electromagnetic field or the collective spin of
a polarised ensemble of atoms. In all of the three examples above there exist
two observables fulfilling (2.1). As we will show, they obey the standard bosonic
commutation relations and so we call these systems bosonic modes. We can deal
with several modes, and in this case ordering the operators by canonical pairs by
RˆT = (qˆ1, pˆ1, qˆ2, pˆ2, ..., qˆN , pˆN ) we can compactly state CCR as
[Rˆi, Rˆj ] = i(JN )ij (2.2)
1Quadrature operators are chosen dimensionless in such a way that ~ is not going to appear in
any formula.
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where i, j = 1, 2, ..., 2N and JN = ⊕Ni=1J accounts for all modes while J is the so-
called symplectic matrix which corresponds to a antisymmetric and non-degenerate
form fullfilling (i) ∀η, ζ ∈ R2N : 〈η|J |ζ〉 = −〈ζ|J |η〉 and (ii) ∀η : 〈η|J |ζ〉 = 0⇒ ζ = 0.
In the appropriate choice of basis (canonical coordinates) the symplectic matrix is
brought into the standard form J =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
2.2 Canonical Commutation Relations
The CCR (2.1) are related with the classical Poisson brackets via the 1st quantisation
transcription: {A,B}pp ≡
∑
µ(
∂A
∂Qµ
∂B
∂Pµ
− ∂B∂Qµ ∂A∂Pµ ) −→ −i[Aˆ, Bˆ] ≡ −i(AˆBˆ − BˆAˆ)
and A −→ Aˆ. They can be also described by using the annihilation and creation
operators aˆµ and aˆ
†
µ which obey the standard bosonic commutation relations
[aˆµ, aˆ
†
ν ] = δµν , [aˆµ, aˆν ] = [aˆ
†
µ, aˆ
†
ν ] = 0 (2.3)
µ, ν = 1, 2, ..., N . The CCR in forms (2.2) and (2.3) are related by a unitary matrix
U = 1/
√
2
(
IN iIN
IN −iN I
)
such that if we define OˆT = (aˆ1, aˆ2, ..., aˆN , aˆ
†
1, aˆ
†
2, ..., aˆ
†
N )
then Oˆi = UijRˆj .
The representation of the CCR up to unitaries is not unique. For instance, for a
single mode in the Schro¨dinger representation each degree of freedom is embedded in
H = L2(R), while the operators qˆ and pˆ act multiplicative and derivative respectively
qˆ = q
pˆ = −i ∂∂q
}
(2.4)
but also qˆ = +i ∂∂p , pˆ = p is equally possible. In both representations the operators
are unbounded.
A way to remove ambiguities (up to unitaries) and to treat with bounded oper-
ators is using the Weyl operators. The Weyl operator is defined as
Wˆζ ≡ eiζT ·J ·Rˆ (2.5)
where ζT = (ζ1, ζ2, ..., ζ2N ). Then the Weyl operators satisfies the Weyl relation
WˆζWˆη = e
− i
2
ζT ·J ·ηWˆζ+η, (2.6)
or in an analogous way
WˆζWˆη = WˆηWˆζe
−iζT ·J ·η. (2.7)
Theorem 2.2.1 (Stone-von Neumann theorem) Let Wˆ1 and Wˆ2 be two Weyl sys-
tems over a finite dimensional phase space (N < ∞). If the two Weyl systems are
strongly continuous 2 and irreducible 3 then they are equivalent (up to an unitary).
2∀|ψ〉 ∈ H : limζ→0 || |ψ〉 − Wˆζ |ψ〉|| = 0 .
3∀ζ ∈ R2N : [Wˆζ , Aˆ] = 0⇒ Aˆ ∝ I.
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According to the theorem 2.2.1 there exists only one equivalent representation of the
Weyl relation.
The Weyl operator acts in the states as a translation in the phase space (displace-
ments eiηpˆ|q〉 = |q− η〉 and kicks eiζqˆ|q〉 = eiζq|q〉) as it can be checked by looking to
its action onto an arbitrary position-momentum operator
Wˆ †ζ RˆiWˆζ = Rˆi − ζiI (2.8)
2.3 Phase-space
Phase space formulation of Quantum Mechanics offers a framework in which Quan-
tum phenomena can be described using as much classical language as allowed. It
appeals naturally to one’s intuition and can often provide useful physical insights.
Furthermore, it requires dealing only with constant number equations and not with
operators, which can be of significant practical advantage. This mathematical ad-
vantage arises here from the fact that the infinite-dimensional complex Hilbert space
structure which is in principle a difficult object to work with, can be mapped into the
linear algebra structure of the finite-dimensional real phase space. We will extend
this map (2.3.1) and how to characterise states and operations in sections (2.4) and
(2.3.2) respectively.
2.3.1 Phase space geometry
A system ofN canonical degrees of freedom is described classically in a 2N -dimensional
real vector space 4 V ≃ R2N . Together with the symplectic form it defines a sym-
plectic real vector space (the phase space) Ω ≃ R2N . The phase space is naturally
equipped with a complex structure and can be identified with a complex Hilbert
space HΩ ≃ CN . If 〈 | 〉 stands for the scalar product in HΩ and 〈 | 〉J for the
symplectic scalar product in V their connection reads
〈η|ζ〉 = 〈Jη|ζ〉J + i〈η|ζ〉J (2.9)
where η = (q, p) ∈ V while η = q + ip ∈ HΩ such that any orthonormal basis in HΩ
leads to a canonical basis in V . Moreover, any unitary operator (which preserve the
scalar product) acting on HΩ leads to a symplectic operation S in the phase space in
such a way that the symplectic scalar product is also preserved. The inverse is also
true provided that the symplectic operation commutes with the symplectic matrix
J .
2.3.2 Symplectic operations
We hence define symplectic canonical transformation S as these ones which preserve
the CCR and therefore leave the basic kinematic rules unchanged. That is, if we
4They are isomorphic (there exist a bijective morphism between the two groups).
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transform our quadrature operators RˆS = S · Rˆ still equation (2.2) is fulfilled. In
a totally equivalent way we can define symplectic transformation as the ones which
preserve the symplectic scalar product and therefore 5
ST · J · S = J. (2.10)
The set of real 2N×2N matrices S satisfying the above condition form the symplectic
group Sp(2N,R). To construct the affine symplectic group we just need to add
also the phase space translations whose group generators are Gˆ
(0)
i = JijRˆj . Apart
from that, the group generators of the representation of Sp(2N,R) which physically
corresponds to the Hamiltonians which perform the symplectic transformations on
the states are of the form 12{Rˆi, Rˆj}. This corresponds to hermitian Hamiltonians
of quadratic order in the canonical operators. When rewriting them in terms of
creation / annihilation operators we can divide it into two groups.
Compact generators (passive):
Gˆ
(1)
µν = i
(aˆ†µ aˆν−aˆ†ν aˆµ)
2 , Gˆ
(2)
µν =
(aˆ†µ aˆν+aˆ
†
ν aˆµ)
2
and non-Compact generators (active):
Gˆ
(3)
µν = i
(aˆ†µ aˆ
†
ν−aˆν aˆµ)
2 , Gˆ
(4)
µν =
(aˆ†µ aˆ
†
ν+aˆν aˆµ)
2 .
The passive ones are generators which commute with all the number operators
nˆµ ≡ aˆ†µaˆµ and so they preserve the total number, in this sense they are passive.
In case our system corresponds to modes of the electromagnetic field, then, what is
being preserved is the total number of photons. They can be implemented optically
by only using beam splitters, phase shifts and mirrors and conversely, only using
them we can implement any Hamiltonian constructed by a linear combination of the
compact generators. With all the generators we then have enough to generate all
the unitaries, Uˆλ = e
iλ·Gˆ.
As the simplest example for, one mode (N = 1) we have the phase shift operator
Uˆθ = e
iθaˆ†aˆ (2.11)
which amounts to the symplectic operation in phase space
Sθ =
(
cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ
)
. (2.12)
On the other hand we have the active ones, they change the energy of the state. The
most important one is the single mode squeezing operator (N = 1), whose unitary
expression for a fixed angle φ = 0 and squeezing parameter r > 0 reads
Uˆr = e
r
2
(aˆ2−aˆ†2) (2.13)
5From now on we neglect the subscript N in symplectic matrix.
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while its symplectic operation in phase space reads
Sr =
(
e−r 0
0 er
)
. (2.14)
Finally phase space translations for one mode whose unitary is Uˆα = e
αaˆ†−α∗aˆ where
α = (q0+ip0)√
2
, amounts to the symplectic operation in phase space as sα =
(
q0
p0
)
.
The most important non-trivial unitaries for two modes (N = 2) are beam splitters
UˆBS = e
θ
2
(aˆ1aˆ
†
2−aˆ†1aˆ2) (at fixed angle φ = 0, reflectivity R = sin2 θ/2 and transmitivity
T = cos2 θ/2) and two mode squeezings UˆTMS = e
r(aˆ1aˆ2−aˆ†1aˆ†2) that amounts to
SBS =


cos θ/2 0 sin θ/2 0
0 cos θ/2 0 sin θ/2
− sin θ/2 0 cos θ/2 0
0 − sin θ/2 0 cos θ/2

 (2.15)
and
STMS =


cosh r 0 sinh r 0
0 cosh r 0 − sinh r
sinh r 0 cosh r 0
0 − sinh r 0 cosh r

 . (2.16)
2.4 Probability Distribution functions
One of the most important tools of the phase space formulation of Quantum Mechan-
ics are the phase space probability distribution functions. The best known and widely
used is the Wigner distribution function, but there is not a unique way of defining
a quantum phase space distribution function. In fact, several distribution functions
with different properties, rules of association and operator ordering can also be well
defined. For instance sometimes normal ordered (P-function), antinormal ordered
(Q-function), generalised antinormal ordered (Husimi-function),... distributions can
be more convenient depending on the problem being considered. In this dissertation
we are only going to work with the totally symmetrical ordered (Weyl ordered) one,
the Wigner distribution function.
Due to the fact that a joint probability at a fixed position qˆ and momentum pˆ
point is not allowed in Quantum Mechanics by Heisenberg uncertainty theorem, the
quantum phase space distribution function should, therefore, be considered simply
as a mathematical tool that facilitates quantum calculations. Joint probabilities can
be negative, so that one deals with quasiprobability distributions as long as it yields
a correct description of physically observable quantities.
16 Continuous Variable formalism
2.4.1 Quantum states
At the level of density operators, ρˆ defines a quantum state iff it satisfies the following
properties
trρˆ = 1, ρˆ ≥ 0 [⇒ ρˆ† = ρˆ]. (2.17)
This operator belongs to the bounded linear operators Hilbert space B(H). For pure
states the ket and wave function formulation is enough to describe our state. There,
a state lives in a Hilbert space Cd for qudits, (a system of discrete variables) or
L2(RN ) for N modes, (a system of continuous variables).
For systems of continuous variables, the Wigner distribution function gives a
complete description of the state. Given a state ρˆ (a single mode) we define the
Wigner distribution function as 6
Wρ(q, p) = 1
π
∫
dx〈q + x|ρˆ|q − x〉e−2ipx. (2.18)
This transformation is called Weyl-Fourier transformation and it gives the bridge
between density operators and distribution functions. Sometimes, for computational
reasons it is better to compute first the characteristic distribution function which is
obtained through
χρ(ζ, η) = tr{ρˆWˆ(ζ,η)}. (2.19)
The above two distribution functions are fully equivalent in the sense of describing
completely our quantum state and are related by a Symplectic-Fourier transform
Wρ(q, p) = 1
(2π)2
∫
dζ
∫
dη χρ(ζ, η)e
−iζp+iηq =
1
2π
SFT {χρ(ζ, η)}, (2.20)
χρ(ζ, η) =
∫
dq
∫
dpWρ(q, p)eiζp−iηq = 2πSFT −1{Wρ(q, p)}. (2.21)
The Weyl-Fourier transformation is invertible and it provides a way to recover our
density operator from both distribution functions
ρˆ =
1
2π
∫
dq
∫
dp
∫
dζ
∫
dηWρ(q, p)e−iζp+iηqWˆ(−ζ,−η) =
=
1
2π
∫
dζ
∫
dη χρ(ζ, η)Wˆ(−ζ,−η).
(2.22)
At this level, W (and χ) defines a quatum state iff they satisfy the following prop-
erties∫
dq
∫
dpW(q, p) = 1,
∫
dq
∫
dpW(q, p)Wp(q, p) ≥ 0 [⇒ W∗(q, p) =W(q, p)]
(2.23)
6For pure states the definition gets simplified to Wρ(q, p) =
1
pi
∫
dx e−2ipxψ∗(q − x)ψ(q + x).
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for all pure states Wp and
χ(0, 0) = 1,
2N∑
i,j=1
a∗i ajχ(ζj−ζi)e
i
2
(ζTi ·J ·ζj) ≥ 0 [⇒ χ∗(ζ, η) = χ(−ζ,−η)] (2.24)
for all ai,j ∈ R. This can be shown using the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4.1 (Quantum Bochner-Khinchin theorem) For χ(η) to be a character-
istic function of a quantum state the following conditions are necessary and sufficient
1.) χ(0) = 1 and χ(η) is continuous at η = 0,
2.) χ(η) is J − positive (symplectic-positive defined).
2.4.2 Properties of the Wigner distribution
Properties
i) Quasidistribution: It is real valued quasidistribution because it admit negatives
values (a Quantum Mechanics signature).
ii) T-symmetry: It has time symmetry
t→ −t⇐⇒W(q, p, t)→W(q,−p, t). (2.25)
iii) X-symmetry: It has space symmetry
q → −q ⇐⇒W(q, p, t)→W(−q,−p, t). (2.26)
iv) Galilei invariant: It is Galilei invariant
q → q − a⇐⇒W(q, p, t)→W(q + a, p, t). (2.27)
v) T-evolution: The equation of motion for each point in the phase space is classical
in the absence of forces 7
dρˆ
dt
= −1
i
[ρˆ, Hˆ ]⇐⇒ ∂W(q, p, t)
∂t
= − p
m
∂W(q, p, t)
∂q
. (2.29)
vi) Bounded: It is bounded 8
|W(q, p)| ≤ 1
π
. (2.30)
7Remember that when we are speaking about states of light m has to be interpret as permittivity
of vacuum ǫ0 while there is a minus sign difference with Heisenberg’s equation of motion.
dAˆ
dt
=
1
i
[Aˆ, Hˆ]. (2.28)
8Use Schwarz’s inequality |〈ψ1|ψ2〉|
2 ≤ 〈ψ1|ψ1〉〈ψ2|ψ2〉 at the density operator level i.e. 0 ≤
tr(ρ1ρ2)
n ≤ tr(ρ1)
ntr(ρ2)
n. (no es ven be la dem)
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vii) Normalised: It is well normalised∫
dq
∫
dpW(q, p) = 1. (2.31)
viii) Quantum marginal distributions: It possesses good marginal distributions 9∫
dpW(q, p) = 〈q|ρˆ|q〉 ≥ 0 (2.32)
∫
dqW(q, p) = 〈p|ρˆ|p〉 ≥ 0. (2.33)
ix) Complete orthonormal set: The set of functions Wnm(q, p) form a complete or-
thonormal set (if ψn(q) are already a set)∫
dq
∫
dpW∗nm(q, p)Wn′m′(q, p) =
1
2π
δnn′δmm′ (2.34)
∑
n,m
W∗nm(q, p)Wnm(q′, p′) =
1
2π
δ(q − q′)δ(p − p′) (2.35)
where
Wnm(q, p) = 1
π
∫
dx e−2ipxψ∗n(q − x)ψm(q + x). (2.36)
2.4.3 The generating function of a Classical probability distribution
Denoting by y (x) a random variable which can be discrete y ∈ {yi} (or continuous
x ∈ [a, b]) and its corresponding (density) probability p(yi) (p(x)), we can establish
the normalisation constrain as
∑
yi
p(yi) = 1∫ b
a p(x)dx = 1
}
. (2.37)
Of relevant importance given a probability distribution are the following quantities:
i) Mean value of u(x): E[u(x)] =
∫
u(x)p(x)dx.
ii) Moment of order m respect point c of x: αmc = E[(x− c)m].
iii) Mean value of x: µ = α10 = E[x].
iv) Standard deviation of x: 10 σ =
√
α2µ =
√
E[(x− µ)2].
v) Covariance of xi and xj:
11 Cij = cov(xi, xj) = E[(xi − µi)(xj − µj)]
where i, j = 1, 2, ..., 2N .
9For pure state they correspond to the square modulus of the wave function in position |ψ(q)|2
and in momentum |ψ˜(p)|2 representation.
10Square root of the variance.
11Here subindex i, j labels all the possible variables of the distribution, when they are equal, Cii
corresponds to the variance of the variable xi.
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Theorem 2.4.2 (Taylor’s theorem) Any well behaved distribution function can be
reconstructed by its (in general) infinite moments.
This theorem, of considerable importance, tell us that any distribution p(x) can
be retrieved only by its moments αmc . We define the vector d and the matrix C called
mean vector and covariance matrix by
C = [[cov(xi, xj)]]
d = [[µi]]
}
. (2.38)
What is more important is that d and C encode all the information of 1st and 2nd
moments.
If we define the generating function of the distribution function by a Laplace
transformation (provided it exists)
M(η) = LT {p(x)} = E[exη] (2.39)
all moments can be obtained by subsequently differentiating the generating function
αm0 =
∂(m)M(η)
∂ηm
|η=0. (2.40)
2.4.4 The generating function of a quasi-probability distribution
In the same way as in Classical Probability where all the moments of a distribution
characterise the distribution, the Wigner quasidistribution function is fully charac-
terised by its moments.
To adapt the classical formalism to the quantum Wigner quasidistribution func-
tion we have to introduce the following transcription η −→ iη,M −→ χ,LT −→ FT .
We then define the generating function of the Wigner distribution (characteristic
function) by a Fourier transformation, which always exists, because the Wigner
distribution is an integrable function. In general it is complex and reads
χ(η) = FT {W(x)} = E[eixη] (2.41)
then all moments can be obtained by subsequently differentiating the generating
function
βm0 =
1
im
∂(m)χ(η)
∂ηm
|η=0. (2.42)
Analogously, we define, given a quantum Wigner distribution function the dis-
placement vector (DV) d (a 2N real vector) and the covariance matrix (CM) γ (a
2N × 2N real symmetric matrix). The DV contains the information of the first
moments and in general plays no role, by the space symmetry only relative DVs are
of physical meaning. The CM is much more richer, it contains information (up to
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second moments) about the purity, entanglement, ... The CM to describe a physical
state must be symplectic-positive defined
γ + iJ ≥ 0. (2.43)
2.5 Gaussian states
Among all the CV systems Gaussian states are of greatest importance. The Gaussian
distribution is simple, it is the limit of many others and appears in a great variety
of different conditions. In order to give a motivation we state here one of the most
important theorems (together with the Law of Large Numbers) of the Theory of the
Classical Probability and Statistics, the Central Limit Theorem.
Theorem 2.5.1 (Central limit theorem) Suppose we have n independent random
variables x1, x2, ..., xn which are all distributed with a mean value µ and a standard
deviation σ (each of them can have different arbitrary distribution functions pi(xi)).
In the limit n → ∞ the arithmetic mean x¯ = 1n
∑n
i=1 xi is Gaussian (or normal)
distributed with mean value µ and standard deviation σ√
n
i.e. p¯(x¯) = 1√
2piσ
e−
(x¯−µ)2
2σ2 .
Another way to see the importance of Gaussian probability distributions is en-
coded in the following theorem
Theorem 2.5.2 (Marcinkiewicz’s theorem) If we define the cumulant generating
function as K(η) = lnM(η), then, either the cumulant is a polynomial of order 2 or
it has infinite terms.
Lemma 2.5.1 (Gaussianity lemma) As a consequence then p(x) is a Gaussian(non-
Gaussian) distribution iff the cumulant is a polynomial of order 2(∞).
In general all moments are necessary but as long as we are concern with only
Gaussian distributions, 1st and 2nd moments are sufficient, in fact all other higher
moments can be rewritten in terms of them. This is a consequence of the theorem
2.5.2.
2.5.1 Displacement Vector (DV) and Covariance Matrix (CM)
An important class of quantum states are Gaussian states. They can be defined as
all quantum states whose Wigner distribution function is Gaussian. Thus the DV
and the CM are enough to describe them. Analogously to the classical case, it is
straightforward to obtain the moments of order βm0 of a distribution by differentiating
the generating function. Computing 1st and 2nd moments, through (2.19) we get 12
12Notice: ( ∂
∂ηi
eiη
T ·Rˆ)|ηi=0 = iRˆi and (
∂2
∂ηi∂ηj
eiη
T ·Rˆ)|ηi,j=0 =
1
2
[Rˆi, Rˆj ] − RˆiRˆj = −
1
2
{Rˆi, Rˆj}
where we have used Cambell-Hausdorff formula eAˆ+Bˆ = eAˆeBˆe−
1
2
[Aˆ,Bˆ] (when [Aˆ, Bˆ] ∝ I).
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β10,i = −i
∂
∂ηi
χ(η)|η=0 = tr(ρˆRˆ′i) (2.44)
β20,ij = (−i)2
∂2
∂ηi∂ηj
χ(η)|η=0 = 1
2
tr(ρˆ{Rˆ′i, Rˆ′j}) = tr(ρˆRˆ′iRˆ′j)− i
2
Jij (2.45)
where Rˆ′i = JRˆi.
Finally we define the DV and the CM as 13
di = tr(ρˆRˆi) (2.46)
γij = tr(ρˆ{Rˆi − diIˆ, Rˆj − dj Iˆ}) = 2tr[ρˆ(Rˆi − diIˆ)(Rˆj − dj Iˆ)]− iJij =
= 2Re{tr[ρˆ(Rˆi − diIˆ)(Rˆj − dj Iˆ)]}
(2.47)
It is important to remark here that symplectic operations at the level of the DV
and CM act in such a way that any unitary UˆS maps to the following transformation
γS = S ·γ ·ST and dS = d+s where S stands for an element of the symplectic group,
while s stands for a phase space translation.
With these definitions it can be shown that the Wigner distribution of any Gaus-
sian state can be written in terms of the DV and CM through 14
W(ζ) = 1
πN
√
det γ
e
−(ζ−d)T · 1
γ
·(ζ−d)
(2.48)
while its symplectic-Fourier transform reads
χ(η) = eiη
T ·J ·d−ηT ·JT γ
4
J ·η = eiη
T ·d′−ηT · γ′
4
·η (2.49)
where d′i = Jijdj and γ
′
ij = J
T
ikγklJlj.
Theorem 2.5.3 (Minimum uncertainty states theorem) Equality in Heisenberg’s
uncertainty theorem is attained iff the state is a pure Gaussian state i.e. a rotated
squeezed coherent state, |ψ〉 = UˆθUˆrUˆα|0〉.
All pure Gaussian states of one mode, characterised by its γ (and if necessary by
d), can be obtained from the vacuum state by an arbitrary displacement+squeezing+rotation
in the phase space. These states, by theorem 2.5.3, are minimum uncertainty states.
13For pure states di = 〈Rˆi〉ρ and γij = 〈{Rˆi−diIˆ, Rˆj−dj Iˆ}〉ρ = 〈{Rˆi, Rˆj}〉ρ−2〈Rˆi〉ρ〈Rˆj〉ρ, where,
by the anticommutator definition, we see a factor 2 of difference with the classical analog and so
γij ∼ 2Cij . The diagonal terms can be rewritten in terms of the uncertainties as γii = 2(∆Ri)
2
ρ
where as usual (∆A)ψ =
√
〈Aˆ2〉ψ − (〈Aˆ〉ψ)2.
14We see here that from (2.30) max [W(ζ)] = W(d) = 1
piN
√
det γ
≤ 1
piN
where the equality holds
for pure states only.
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Instead, mixed Gaussian states of one mode can be all obtained from a thermal state
by an arbitrary displacement+squeezing+rotation.
As the cornerstone examples of Gaussian states, we have the vacuum, coherent,
squeezed and thermal states.
*Vacuum: |0〉
γ0 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, d0 =
(
0
0
)
. (2.50)
*(Pure) Coherent: 15 |α〉 = Dˆ(α)|0〉 = Uˆα|0〉
γα = Sαγ0S
T
α =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, dα = d0 + sα =
(
q0
p0
)
, (2.51)
where α = αR + iαI =
q0+ip0√
2
.
*(Pure) Squeezed: |r〉 = Sˆ(r)|0〉 = Uˆr|0〉
γr = Srγ0S
T
r =
(
e−2r 0
0 e2r
)
, dr = d0 + sr =
(
0
0
)
. (2.52)
*(Mixed) Thermal: ρˆβ =
1
piM
∫
d2α|α〉〈α|e−|α|2/M
γβ =
(
2M + 1 0
0 2M + 1
)
, dβ =
(
0
0
)
, (2.53)
where M = 1
eβ−1 ≥ 0 being β the inverse temperature.
2.5.2 Hilbert space, phase space and DV&CM connection
We have already shown how to describe quantum states and operations at the differ-
ent levels i.e. Hilbert space, phase space and DV&CM. Two main connections are
needed still to perform calculations in the phase space: the ordering of the operators
and the metric between them.
The Weyl association rule tells us about the ordering operators. Provided we
are using with the Wigner distribution, which is symmetrical ordered, when working
with observables we have to take into account that as we are in the phase space and
we have avoided its operator character we have to symmetrise them. The way we
have to symmetrise is
eiζqˆ+iηpˆ −→: eiζqˆ+iηpˆ := eiζqˆ+iηpˆ ←→ eiζq+iηp, (2.54)
where : : stands for the symmetrical order. In general for a polynomial on q and p
15A Coherent state can alternatively be defined as the eigenstate of the annihilation op-
erator, aˆ|α〉 = α|α〉. Coherent states form an overcomplete non-orthogonal (〈α|α′〉 =
exp [−(|α|2 + |α′|2)/2 + α∗α′]) set base ( 1
pi
∫
d2α|α〉〈α| = I) of vectors of the Hilbert space.
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qˆnpˆm −→: qˆnpˆm := 1
2n
n∑
r=0
(
n
r
)
qˆrpˆmqˆn−r =
1
2m
m∑
r=0
(
m
r
)
pˆr qˆnpˆm−r ←→ qnpm.
(2.55)
As an example take the observable QP , its quantum associated operator is of
course qˆpˆ. We know that qˆ and pˆ do not commute but in the phase space qp and
pq are functionally treated in the same way. Imagine we need to find its average
value, we have then to remove the ambiguity by totally symmetrising. The recipe is
qˆpˆ −→: qˆpˆ := qˆpˆ+pˆ qˆ2 ←→ qp. And so the average to be performed is
< QP >=< qˆpˆ >ρ=< qp+ i/2 >W (2.56)
because
qˆpˆ =
qˆpˆ+ pˆqˆ
2
+ i/2. (2.57)
More important and relevant averages concern the moments which can be ob-
tained via the Wigner distribution as
di = tr(ρˆRˆi) =
∫
d2N ζ [ζi]W(ζ) (2.58)
γij = tr(ρˆ{Rˆi − diIˆ, Rˆj − dj Iˆ}) =
∫
d2Nζ [2(ζi − di)(ζj − dj)]W(ζ). (2.59)
Theorem 2.5.4 (Quantum Parseval theorem) Let Wˆζ be a strongly continuous and
irreducible Weyl system acting on the Hilbert space HΩ with phase space Ω. Then
Aˆ 7→ tr{AˆWˆζ}, with ζ ∈ Ω, is an isometric map from the Hilbert space H (Hilbert-
Schmidt operators) onto the Hilbert space L2(Ω) (square-integrable measurable func-
tions on Ω) such that
tr(Aˆ†Bˆ) =
1
(2π)N
∫
d2N ζ tr{AˆWˆζ}∗tr{BˆWˆζ}. (2.60)
This theorem is of capital importance, it follows from it how to compute the
scalar product between operators
tr{Aˆ†Bˆ} = 1
(2π)N
∫
d2Nη Aχ∗(η)Bχ(η) =
=
1
(2π)N
∫
d2N ζ AW(ζ)BW(ζ),
(2.61)
the trace of an operator 16
tr{Aˆ} = Aχ(0, 0) = 1
(2π)N
∫
d2N ζ AW(ζ), (2.62)
16Use that IW = 1 and Iχ = (2π)Nδ(2N)(η) computed from eq. (2.66) and eq. (2.65).
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and the expectation value of an observable
〈Aˆ〉ρ = tr{ρˆAˆ} = 1
(2π)N
∫
d2Nη χ∗(η)Aχ(η) =
=
∫
d2N ζ W(ζ)AW(ζ).
(2.63)
To justify the above expression we just need to define properly the Fourier-Weyl
transform as
Aˆ = FWT {Aχ(η)} = 1
(2π)N
∫
d2Nη Aχ(η)Wˆ−η =
=
1
(2π)2N
∫
d2Nη
∫
d2N ζ AW(ζ)eiζ
T ·J ·ηWˆ−η,
(2.64)
and its inverse
Aχ(η) = FWT −1{Aˆ} = tr{AˆWˆη}, (2.65)
AW(ζ¯, η¯) = 2N
∫
dNλ 〈ζ¯ + λ|Aˆ|ζ¯ − λ〉e−2iη¯λ (2.66)
where ζ¯T = (ζ1, ζ2, ..., ζN ) idem for η¯.
AW(ζ) = SFT {Aχ(η)} 17 = 1
(2π)N
∫
d2Nη Aχ(η)e−iζ
T ·J ·η, (2.67)
Aχ(η) = SFT −1{AW(ζ)} 18 = 1
(2π)N
∫
d2Nζ AW(ζ)eiζ
T ·J ·η. (2.68)
An important concept in Quantum Information is the fidelity F between quantum
states. The one we adopt here is the so called Bures-Uhlmann fidelity and it is defined
as follows
F(ρˆ1, ρˆ2) = [tr
√
ρˆ
1/2
1 ρˆ2ρˆ
1/2
1 ]
2. (2.69)
It is symmetric and normalised between 1 (equal states) and 0 (orthogonal states).
Its definition is simplified when one of the two states is pure (say ρˆ1), in this case it
converges to the Hilbert-Schmidt fidelity
F(ρˆ1, ρˆ2) = tr(ρˆ1ρˆ2) = 〈ψ1|ρˆ2|ψ1〉. (2.70)
In case both states are pure, then, the fidelity becomes simply the overlap between
the two states
F(ρˆ1, ρˆ2) = |〈ψ1|ψ2〉|2. (2.71)
17Notice that AW = (2π)NW if Aˆ = ρˆ see eq. (2.18) (for normalisation convenience).
18Notice that Aχ = χ if Aˆ = ρˆ see eq. (2.19).
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It is useful here to use theorem 2.5.4 to evaluate the Hilbert-Schmidt fidelity
between two Gaussian state (at least when one is pure) 19
F(ρˆ1, ρˆ2) = tr(ρˆ1ρˆ2) =
(
1
2π
)N ∫
d2Nη χ∗1(η)χ2(η) = (2π)
N
∫
d2NζW1(ζ)W2(ζ) =
=
1√
det(γ1+γ22 )
e
−dT ( 1
γ1+γ2
)d
(2.72)
where γ1(2) and d1(2) belongs to ρˆ1(2), while d = d2 − d1.
Another important concept in Quantum Information is the purity P of a quantum
state. The purity is defined as follows
P(ρˆ) = tr(ρˆ2) (2.73)
It is normalised between 1 (pure states) and 0 (maximally mixed states). Also
here using theorem 2.5.4 we can evaluate the purity of a Gaussian state 20
P(ρˆ) = (2π)N
∫
d2Nζ [W(ζ)]2 = 1√
det γ
(2.74)
2.6 Multipartite states and entanglement
If we want to treat the entanglement of a quantum state, first we need to introduce
multipartite states. In general we have to extend the Hilbert space. At the level of
density operators this means that we have to “tensor product“⊗, the Hilbert space of
each party i.e. H =⊗Nk=1Hk. The covariance matrix structure for Gaussian states
turns to be simplified to a ”direct sum“ ⊕, of each party’s associated phase space i.e.
Ω =
⊕N
k=1Ωk. This is reminiscent of the Quantum Parseval theorem, which trans-
forms tensor product between density matrices to products of Wigner functions (and
Characteristic functions) and at the same time direct sums of covariance matrices.
Therefore, the advantage of using Gaussian states is that we fully describe a state
by a finite dimensional 2×2 matrix instead of its infinite dimensional density matrix.
Additionally, dimensionality of the phase space increases slower, as dimensions are
added instead of multiplied. 21
2.6.1 Bipartite Gaussian states
Any bipartite Gaussian state can be written in a block structure as γ =
(
A C
CT B
)
,
where A = AT and B = BT .
19The second and third equality is true for all CV states.
20The first equality is true for all CV states.
21Remember that dim(ρˆ1 ⊗ ρˆ2) = dim(ρˆ1) dim(ρˆ2) while dim(γ1 ⊕ γ2) = dim(γ1) + dim(γ2).
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Lemma 2.6.1 (Normal form) Every 1× 1 mode Gaussian state can be transformed
(by two local symplectic transformations) to
γ =


λa 0 kx 0
0 λa 0 kp
kx 0 λb 0
0 kp 0 λb

 . (2.75)
If we define the four invariants of an arbitrary state A = detA, B = detB,
C = detC and Υ = det γ, then the following holds
λa =
√
A
λb =
√
B
kx =
1
2
(α−
√
α2 − 4C)
kp =
1
2
(α+
√
α2 − 4C)
α =
√
(
(
√AB + C)2 −Υ√AB )
(2.76)
Lemma 2.6.2 (Standard form) Every 1×1 mode Gaussian state can be transformed
(by local quasi-free symplectic transformations) to
γ =


λa 0 kx 0
0 λa 0 −kp
kx 0 λb 0
0 −kp 0 λb

 , (2.77)
where λa, λb ≥ 1 and kx ≥ |kp|.
A Gaussian state in the Standard form is called symmetric if λa = λb, and fully
symmetric if it is symmetric and in addition kx = kp.
2.6.2 Entanglement of Gaussian states
For discrete variable systems an important separability criteria based on the partial
transpose (time reversal) exists.
Lemma 2.6.3 (NPPT Peres criteria) Given a bipartite state ρˆ, if it has non-positive
partial transpose (ρˆTA  0⇒ ρˆTB  0), then ρˆ is entangled.
Lemma 2.6.4 (NPPT Horodecki criteria) In C2⊗C2 and C2⊗C3 given a bipartite
state ρˆ, it is entangled iff it has non-positive partial transpose (ρˆTA  0⇒ ρˆTB  0).
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For continuous variable states, Peres criteria also holds while Horodecki criteria
is true provided our state is composed of 1 × N modes. In particular for Gaussian
states, time reversal is very easy to implement at the covariance matrix level. If Tˆ is
the reversal operator then ST = θ =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
is the symplectic operations in phase
space. So we can rewrite the lemma 2.6.4 for Gaussian states as
Lemma 2.6.5 (NPPT Horodecki’s criteria) For 1×N modes given a bipartite Gaus-
sian state γ, it is entangled iff it has non-positive partial transpose (θAγθ
T
A + iJ 
0⇒ θBγθTB + iJ  0).
Concerning entanglement measures we use as an entanglement measure for pure
state the Entropy of entanglement and for mixed ones the Logarithmic negativity.
*(Pure states) Entropy of entanglement:
ES(ρˆ) = S(ρˆA) = −tr(ρˆA log ρˆA), (2.78)
where S is the von Neumann Entropy 22 S(ρˆ) = −tr(ρˆ log ρˆ), and ρˆA is the trace
over B defined as ρˆA = trB(ρˆ). For any state it reduces (in terms of the Schmidt
coefficients) to
ES(ρˆ) = −
∞∑
i=0
C2i logC
2
i , (2.79)
while for Gaussian states,
ES(γ) = −
NA∑
i=1
[(
µi + 1
2
) log(
µi + 1
2
)− (µi − 1
2
) log(
µi − 1
2
)], (2.80)
where {µi} = spec(−iJγA).
*(Mixed states) Logarithmic negativity (additive monotone):
EN (ρˆ) = LN(ρˆ) = log ||ρˆTA ||1, (2.81)
where || ||1 is the trace norm defined as ||ρˆ||1 = tr|ρˆ| = tr
√
ρˆT ρˆ =
∑
singularvalues(ρˆ).
For Gaussian states,
EN (γ) = −
N∑
i=1
log[min(µ˜i, 1)], (2.82)
where {µ˜i} = spec(−iJγTA).
22The logarithm is in base 2.
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2.7 Appendix of integrals
Gaussian integrals:
∫
e−ζ
T ·A·ζd2N ζ =
πN√
detA
(2.83)
∫
e−ζ
T ·A·ζ−bT ·ζd2N ζ =
πN√
detA
eb
T · 1
4A
·b (2.84)
Non-Gaussian integrals:
∫
ζmii ζ
mj
j ζ
mk
k ···e−ζ
T ·A·ζd2N ζ = (−1)mi+mj+mk+··· π
N
√
detA
∂mi
∂bmii
∂mj
∂b
mj
j
∂mk
∂bmkk
···ebT · 14A ·b
∣∣∣∣∣
bi=0,bj=0,bk=0,···
(2.85)
∫
ζmii ζ
mj
j ζ
mk
k ···e−ζ
T ·A·ζ−cT ·ζd2Nζ =
= (−1)mi+mj+mk+··· π
N
√
detA
∂mi
∂bmii
∂mj
∂b
mj
j
∂mk
∂bmkk
···e(b+c)T · 14A ·(b+c)
∣∣∣∣∣
bi=0,bj=0,bk=0,···
(2.86)
Useful integrals: ∫
W(ζ)d2N ζ = 1 (2.87)
∫
(W(ζ))2d2N ζ = 1
(2π)N
√
det γ
(2.88)
∫
χ(η)d2Nη =
(4π)N√
det γ
e−d
T 1
γ
d (2.89)
∫
(χ(η))2d2Nη =
(2π)N√
det γ
e−d
T 4
γ
d (2.90)
∫
|χ(η)|2d2Nη = (2π)
N
√
det γ
(2.91)
Chapter 3
Efficiency in QKD protocols
with entangled Gaussian states
Efficiency is a key issue in any real implementation of a cryptographic protocol since
the physical resources are not unlimited. We will first show that Quantum Key Dis-
tribution is possible with an ”Entanglement based“ scheme with NPPT symmetric
Gaussian states in spite of the fact that these systems cannot be distilled with Gaus-
sian operations (they are all bound entangled). In this work we analyze the secrecy
properties of Gaussian states under Gaussian operations. Although such operations
are useless for quantum distillation, we prove that it is possible to distill efficiently a
secret key secure against finite coherent attacks from sufficiently entangled Gaussian
states with non-positive partial transposition. Moreover, all such states allow for
efficient key distillation, when the eavesdropper is assumed to perform individual
attacks before the reconciliation process. In section (3.1) we present the academic
protocol [5], while in section (3.2) we present the way to perform QKD with in the
protocol in an efficient way.
3.1 State of the problem: QKD with entangled Gaus-
sian states
Before presenting the protocol it is important to notice that Gaussian states always
admit a purification. Thus, any mixed Gaussian state of N modes can be expressed
as the reduction of a pure Gaussian state of 2N modes of the form:
γ2N =
(
γN CN
CTN θNγNθ
T
N
)
, CN = JN
√
−(JNγN )2 − I θN , θN =
N⊕
i=1
θ,
such that the mixed state can be obtained after tracing out N modes from γ2N .
Here θ =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, which is the momentum reflection in phase-space, is the associated
symplectic operation.
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For what follows it is also important the fact that any NPPT Gaussian state can
be mapped by Gaussian Local Operations and Classical Communication (GLOCC)
to an NPPT symmetric state of 1× 1 modes i.e. preserving the amount of entangle-
ment.
As the last remark, to deal with the content of the entanglement in Gaussian
states we are going to use the negativity. As it was stated in section (2.6.2), in terms
of CMs and for 1×1 and 1×N modes of bipartite Gaussian states the PPT criterion,
which tells us that a state ρˆ is entangled if and only if it has non positive partial
transposition, reads θAγθ
T
A + iJ < 0.
With all the formalism at hand we now review the main steps of the protocol used
in [5]. Without loosing generality, and by virtue of the above properties of Gaussian
states, one should only consider the case in which Alice and Bob share many copies of
a quantum system of 1×1 symmetric NPPT Gaussian state ρˆAB . To extract a list of
classically correlated bits to establish a secret key, each party measures the quadra-
tures of her/his mode XˆA,B and accepts only those outputs xA,B for which both par-
ties have a consistent result |xA| = |xB | = x0. With probability p(i, j), each party
associates the classical bit i = 0(1) to her/his outcome +x0(−x0). The probability
that their symbols do not coincide is given by ǫAB = (
∑
i 6=j p(i, j))/(
∑
i,j p(i, j)).
Having fixed a string of M classical correlated values, they can apply Classical Ad-
vantage Distillation [11]. To this aim, Alice generates a random bit b and encodes her
string of M classical bits into a vector ~b of length M such that bAi+ bi = b mod (2).
Bob checks that for his symbols all results bBi + bi = b
′ mod (2) are consistent, and
in this case accepts the bit b. The new error probability is given by
ǫAB,M =
(ǫAB)
M
(1− ǫAB)M + (ǫAB)M <
(
ǫAB
1− ǫAB
)M
, (3.1)
which tends to zero for sufficiently largeM . The most general scenario for eavesdrop-
ping is to assume that Eve has access to the states before their distribution. Hence,
the states that Alice and Bob share correspond to the reduction of a pure 4-mode
state. We consider two types of attacks: (i) individual (or incoherent) attack, where
Eve performs individual measurements, possibly non-Gaussian, over her set of states
and (ii) finite coherent (or collective) attack, where Eve waits until the distribution
has been performed, and, decides, which collective measurement gives her more in-
formation on the final key. Now, security with respect to individual attacks from the
eavesdropper Eve, can be established if
(
ǫAB
1− ǫAB
)M
< |〈e++|e−−〉|M , (3.2)
where |e±±〉 denotes the state of Eve once Alice and Bob have projected their states
onto | ± x0〉. Notice that Eve can gain information if the overlap between her states
after Alice and Bob have measured coincident results is sufficiently small. The above
inequalities come from the fact that in the case of individual attacks the error on
3.2 Efficient QKD with entangled Gaussian states 31
Eve’s estimation of the final bit b is bound from below by a term proportional to
|〈e++|e−−〉|M [5]. Therefore, Alice and Bob can establish a key if
ǫAB
1− ǫAB < |〈e++|e−−〉|. (3.3)
In [5] it was shown that any 1× 1 NPPT state fulfils the above inequality and thus
any NPPT Gaussian state can be used to establish a secure key in front of individual
eavesdropper attacks. If we assume that Eve performs more powerful attacks, namely
finite coherent attacks, then security is only guaranteed if the much more restrictive
condition
ǫAB
1− ǫAB < |〈e++|e−−〉|
2 (3.4)
is fulfilled. This new inequality is violated by some NPPT states. Notice that
this implies that the analysed protocol is not good for these states in this more
general scenario. Nevertheless, using the recent techniques of [17], one can find
states for which the presented protocol allows to extract common bits secure against
this attack.
3.2 Efficient QKD with entangled Gaussian states
Let us now present our results. Notice that since security relies on the fact that
Alice and Bob have better correlations than the information the eavesdropper can
learn about their state, perfect correlation is not a requirement to establish a secure
key. We denote Alice’s outputs by x0A and we calculate which are the outputs Bob
can accept so that the correlation established between Alice and Bob outputs can
be used to extract a secret bit.
We use the standard form of a bipartite 1× 1 mode Gaussian state,
γAB =


λA 0 cx 0
0 λA 0 −cp
cx 0 λB 0
0 −cp 0 λB

 (3.5)
with λA,B ≥ 1, and cx ≥ |cp| ≥ 0 (we can shift the displacement vector to 0).
We shall deal with mixed symmetric states and so λA = λB = λ. The positivity
condition reads (λ − cx)(λ + cp) ≥ 1, while the entanglement NPPT condition is
given by (λ − cx)(λ − cp) < 1. As in [5], we impose that the global state including
Eve is pure (she has access to all degrees of freedom outside Alice an Bob) while the
mixed symmetric state, shared by Alice and Bob is just its reduction,
γABE =
(
γAB C
CT θγABθ
T
)
, (3.6)
C = JAB
√
−(JABγAB)2 − I2 θAB =


0 −X 0 −Y
−X 0 −Y 0
0 −Y 0 −X
−Y 0 −X 0

 , (3.7)
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θAB = θA ⊕ θB, JAB = JA ⊕ JB , (3.8)
where
X =
√
a+ b+
√
a− b
2
,
Y =
√
a+ b−√a− b
2
,
and a = λ2 − cxcp − 1, b = λ(cx − cp).
Performing a measurement with uncertainty σ, the probability that Alice finds
±|x0A| while Bob finds ±|x0B |, is given by the overlap between the state of Alice and
Bob, ρˆAB, and a pure product state ρˆA,i⊗ ρˆB,j (with i, j = 0, 1) of Gaussians centred
at ±|x0A|(±|x0B |) respectively with σ width (notice ρˆA,0 ≡ |+ |x0A|〉〈+|x0A||). We
use here the Hilbert-Schmidt fidelity for calculation, which gives:
p(0, 0) = p(1, 1) = tr[ρˆAB(ρˆA,0 ⊗ ρˆB,0)] =
= (2π)4
∫
d4ζABWρAB (ζAB)WρA,0⊗ρB,0(ζAB) =
= K(σ) exp
(
2|x0A||x0B |cx − (λ+ σ2)(x20A + x20B)
(λ+ σ2)2 − c2x
)
,
(3.9)
for the probability that their symbols do coincide and,
p(0, 1) = p(1, 0) = K(σ) exp
(−2|x0A||x0B |cx − (λ+ σ2)(x20A + x20B)
(λ+ σ2)2 − c2x
)
, (3.10)
for the probability that they do not coincide, where
K(σ) =
4σ2√
(λ+ σ2)2 − c2x
√
(λσ2 + 1)2 − c2pσ4
. (3.11)
Their error probability for σ → 0 reads
ǫAB = lim
σ→0
∑
i 6=j p (i, j)∑
i,j p (i, j)
=
1
1 + exp
(
4cx|x0A||x0B|
λ2−c2x
) . (3.12)
Let us calculate the state of Eve |e±±〉 after Alice has projected onto | ± |x0A|〉 and
Bob onto | ± |x0B |〉:
γ++ = γ−− =
(
γx 0
0 γ−1x
)
, γx =
(
λ cx
cx λ
)
, (3.13)
d±± = ∓


0
0
Aδx0 −B∆x0
Aδx0 +B∆x0

 , (3.14)
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where A =
√
a+b
λ+cx
, B =
√
a−b
λ−cx , ∆x0 = |x0B | − |x0A| and δx0 = |x0B | + |x0A|. The
overlap between the two states of Eve is given by:
|〈e++|e−−〉|2 = exp
(
−4
λ2 − c2x
[(
x20A + x
2
0B
2
)
(λ2 − c2x − 1)λ+
+ |x0A||x0B |
(
cx − cp(λ2 − c2x)
) ])
. (3.15)
Substituting Eqs. (3.12) and (3.15) into (3.3) one can check, after some algebra,
that the last inequality reduces to:
(
x20A + x
2
0B
2
)
(λ2 − c2x − 1)λ+ |x0A||x0B |
(−cx − cp(λ2 − c2x)) < 0. (3.16)
Notice that condition (3.16) imposes both, restrictions on the parameters defining
the state (λ, cx, cp), and on the outcomes of the measurements (x0A, x0B). The
constraints on the state parameters are equivalent to demand that the state is NPPT
and satisfies
(λ− cx)(λ+ cx) ≥ 1. (3.17)
Nevertheless, as cx ≥ cp, any positive state fulfils this condition. Hence for any
NPPT symmetric state, there exists, for a given x0A, a range of values of x0B such
that secret bits can be extracted (Eq. (3.3) is fulfilled). This range is given by
∆x0 = |x0B | − |x0A| ∈ Dα =
[
2
−√α− 1 ,
2√
α− 1
]
|x0A|, (3.18)
where
α =
(
cx − λ
cx + λ
)[
1− (λ+ cx)(λ+ cp)
1− (λ− cx)(λ− cp)
]
. (3.19)
After Alice communicates |x0A| to Bob, he will accept only measurement outputs
within the above interval. The interval ∆x0 is well defined if α ≥ 1, which equals to
fulfil Eq. (3.17). Notice also that the interval is not symmetric around |x0A| because
the probabilities calculated in Eqs. (3.9) and (3.10) do depend on this value in a
non-symmetric way. The length Dα of the interval of valid measurements outputs
for Bob is given by
Dα =
4
√
α
α− 1 |x0A|. (3.20)
It can be observed that maximal Dα → ∞ (α = 1) corresponds to the case when
Alice and Bob share a pure state (Eve is disentangled from the system) and thus
condition (3.3) is always fulfilled. On the other hand, any mixed NPPT symmetric
state (α > 1) admits a finite Dα. This ensures a finite efficiency on establishing a
secure secret key in front of individual attacks.
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If we assume that Eve performs more powerful attacks, namely finite coherent
attacks, then security is only guaranteed if [5]:
ǫAB
1− ǫAB < |〈e++|e−−〉|
2. (3.21)
This condition is more restrictive than (3.3). With a similar calculation as before we
obtain that now security is not guaranteed for all mixed entangled symmetric NPPT
states, but only for those that also satisfy:
λ− (λ+ cx)(λ− cx)(λ− cp) > 0. (3.22)
For such states, and given a measurement result x0A of Alice, Bob will only accept
outputs within the range:
∆x0 = |x0B | − |x0A| ∈ Dβ =
[
2
−√β − 1 ,
2√
β − 1
]
|x0A|, (3.23)
where
β =
2λ(λ2 − c2x − 1)
λ− (λ+ cx)(λ− cx)(λ− cp) ≥ 1. (3.24)
As before, β ≥ 1 is fulfilled by conditions (3.17) and (3.22).
Let us now focus on the efficiency issue. We define the efficiency E(γAB) of the
protocol for a given state γAB , as the average probability of obtaining a classically
correlated bit. Explicitly,
E(γAB) =
∫
∆x0∈D
dx0Adx0B(1− ǫAB)tr(ρˆAB |x0A, x0B〉〈x0A, x0B |). (3.25)
The marginal distribution in phase-space is easily computed by integrating the cor-
responding Wigner function in momentum space [16]:
tr(ρˆAB |x0A, x0B〉〈x0A, x0B |) =
∫ ∫
dpAdpBWρAB (ζAB) =
=
exp
(
2cxx0Ax0B−λ(x20A+x20B)
λ2−c2x
)
π
√
λ2 − c2x
,
(3.26)
but the final expression of Eq. (3.25) has to be calculated numerically. Note that
if Alice and Bob share as a resource M identical states (NPPT state for individual
attacks, and NPPT fulfilling condition (3.22) for finite coherent attacks), the number
of classically correlated bits that can be extracted from them is ∼ M×E(γAB). The
efficiency Eq. (3.25) increases with increasing D and decreasing ǫAB. In particular,
for the protocol given in [5], D = 0, and therefore E(γAB) = 0 for any state.
We investigate now the dependence of E(γAB) with the entanglement of the
NPPT mixed symmetric state used for the protocol as well as with the purity of the
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Figure 3.1: Protocol efficiency (quantified by E(γAB)) versus the entanglement mea-
sured by logarithmic negativity LN(γAB). The shading from black to white corre-
sponds to purity from zero to one.
state. As a measure of the entanglement between Alice and Bob we compute the
logarithmic negativity
LN(γAB) = log2
(
1√
(λ− cx)(λ− cp)
)
> 0. (3.27)
In Fig. 3.1, we display the efficiency of the protocol (assuming individual attacks)
versus entanglement shared between Alice and Bob for different states γAB. There
is not a one-to-one correspondence between E(γAB) and entanglement, since states
with the same entanglement can have different purity, which can lead to different
efficiency. This is so because there are two favourable scenarios to fulfil Eq. (3.3).
The first one is to demand large correlations so that the relative error ǫAB of Alice
and Bob is small. The second scenario happens when Alice and Bob share a state
with high purity, i.e., Eve is very disentangled. In this case, independently of the
error ǫAB, Eq. (3.3) can be fulfilled more easily.
Despite the fact that efficiency generally increases with increasing entanglement,
this enhancement, as depicted in the figure, is a complex function of the parame-
ters involved. Nevertheless, one can see that there exist an entanglement threshold
(around LN(γAB) ≃ 0.2) below which the protocol efficiency diminishes drastically
no matter how mixed are the states shared between Alice and Bob.
It is also illustrative to examine the dependence of α (which determines the
interval length Dα) on the entanglement of the states shared by Alice and Bob. In
Fig. 3.2 we plot the logarithmic negativity of a given state versus the parameter
α. States with the same entanglement but different purity are associated to quite
different values of α. Nevertheless states with high entanglement permit a large
interval length (small α) and, thus, high efficiency.
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Figure 3.2: Entanglement of the states shared between Alice and Bob measured in
terms of the logarithmic negativity LN(γAB) as a function of the parameter α(γAB)
under individual attacks. The shading from black to white corresponds to purity
from zero to one.
In both, Fig. 3.1 and Fig. 3.2, we have observed that states with different
entanglement give the same efficiency. However it is important to pointed out that
to extract the key’s bits, Classical Advantage Distillation [11] stills needs to be
performed. The efficiency of Maurer’s protocol, strongly increases with decreasing
ǫAB, and, therefore, the states with higher entanglement will provide a higher key
rate.
Chapter 4
Summary and Conclusions
Efficiency is a key issue for any experimental implementation of Quantum Cryptog-
raphy since available resources are not unlimited. Here, we have shown that the
sharing of entangled Gaussian variables and the use of only Gaussian operations
permits efficient Quantum Key Distribution against individual and finite coherent
attacks.
We have used the fact that all mixed NPPT symmetric states can be used to
extract secret bits under individual attacks whereas under finite coherent attacks an
additional condition has to be fulfilled. We have introduced a figure of merit (the
efficiency E) to quantify the number of classical correlated bits that can be used
to distill a key from a sample of M entangled states. We have observed that this
quantity grows with the entanglement shared between Alice and Bob. This relation
it is not one-to-one due to the fact that states with less entanglement but with more
purity (eavesdropper more disentangled) can be equally efficient. Nevertheless we
have point out that, these states would be inefficient, when performing the Classical
Advantage Distillation of the key.
Finally, we would like to remark that our study is not restricted to Quantum
Key Distribution protocols, but can be extended to any other protocol that uses as
a resource entangled continuous variables to establish a set of classically correlated
bits between distant parties, see e.g. [18].
In [18] an efficient solution of the Byzantine Agreement problem (detectable
broadcast) in the continuous variable scenario with multipartite entangled Gaussian
states and Gaussian operations (homodyne detection) is presented. In a crypto-
graphic context, detectable broadcast refers to distributed protocols in which some
of the participants might have malicious intentions and could try to sabotage the dis-
tributed protocol inducing the honest parties to take contradictory actions between
them. Entanglement is used in the protocol to distribute classical private random
variables with a specific correlation between the players, in such a way that any
malicious manipulation of the data can be detected by all honest parties allowing
them to abort the protocol. We discuss realistic implementations of the protocol,
which consider the possibility of having inefficient homodyne detectors, not perfectly
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correlated outcomes, and noise in the preparation of the resource states. The pro-
posed protocol is proven to be robust and efficiently applicable under such non-ideal
conditions.
Following [19], it is known that, in spite of their exceptional role within the space
of all continuous variables states, in fact, Gaussian states are not the best candidates
as resources to perform Quantum tasks. In general, any continuous, strongly, super-
additive functional acting on any given covariance matrix is minimised by Gaussian
states. This is the case for all entanglement measures fulfiling the above conditions
e.g. the distillable entanglement or the entanglement of formation. In this sense
Gaussian states are extremal. With this idea on mind, naturally one could try to
perform QKD with non-Gaussian states. Following the presented protocol here one
should expect an enhancement on the efficiency on the key distribution with non-
Gaussian states. Gaussian states possess an easy mathematical description at the
covariance matrix level while for non-Gaussian states this description is not complete.
Nevertheless, the Wigner distribution function formalism presented here, allows to
perform the needed calculations to study QKD with non-Gaussian states, in a very
similar way.
Also, for non-Gaussian states there are no computable entanglement measures
while these are well established in the case of Gaussian states. Thus, one might think
that a way to quantify entanglement in non-Gaussian states can be accomplished
by relating the efficiency of distilling correlated bits with the entanglement of non-
Gaussian states [20]. From the experimental point of view, there already exist several
groups which actually have succeeded in producing non-Gaussian states like photon-
substracted, states that up to now lack of a complete well caracterisation.
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